fix: accept audit harness tenant rehome CLI aliases

feat: add guarded tenant rehome with rollback verification
2026-09-26 17:02:16 +07:00 · 2026-09-26 16:48:10 +07:00
5 changed files with 993 additions and 0 deletions
--- a/docs/TENANT-REHOME.md
+++ b/docs/TENANT-REHOME.md
@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
+# Перенос арендатора Staff
+
+`scripts/rehome-tenant.mjs` переносит все строки из одного tenant ID в другой в схеме `public`. Скрипт рассчитан на остановленное приложение и запускается только привилегированной ролью БД, способной обходить RLS и изменять таблицы. Строки пароля или подключения в отчёты не выводятся.
+
+CLI по умолчанию выполняет только read-only dry-run; `--dry-run` можно указать явно. Совместимые имена `--from`/`--to` и `--json` принимаются для rehearsal-обвязок; вывод всегда JSON. Сначала на восстановленной копии базы выполните dry-run:
+
+```powershell
+$env:DATABASE_ADMIN_URL = 'postgresql://…'
+node scripts/rehome-tenant.mjs --from <ULID> --to <ULID> --dry-run --json
+```
+
+Для совместимости со старыми локальными инструкциями также принимаются `DATABASE_REHOME_URL` и `DATABASE_MIGRATION_URL` как fallback. `--apply` по-прежнему требует явный флаг, actor и проверенный `--backup-evidence`; aliases и default dry-run не разрешают запись сами по себе.
+
+Dry-run открывает транзакцию `READ ONLY` и выводит только идентификаторы переноса и количество строк по таблицам. Он не блокирует записи; поэтому результат является снимком для планирования, а не гарантией актуальности на момент apply. На копии и в согласованное окно с остановленным приложением повторите dry-run непосредственно перед переносом.
+
+## Обязательное подтверждение восстановления
+
+Apply требует `--backup-evidence <путь>` и читает JSON отчёт. Само имя файла и существование файла не считаются доказательством. JSON должен содержать сведения о зашифрованном off-host `pg_dump -Fc` и успешном restore drill именно этого backup:
+
+```json
+{
+  "backup": {
+    "format": "pg_dump -Fc",
+    "encrypted": true,
+    "offHost": true,
+    "sha256": "<64 hex characters>",
+    "createdAt": "2026-09-26T08:00:00Z"
+  },
+  "restoreDrill": {
+    "status": "passed",
+    "backupSha256": "<same 64 hex characters>",
+    "restoredAt": "2026-09-26T08:30:00Z",
+    "verifiedAt": "2026-09-26T08:45:00Z",
+    "isolatedDatabase": "krona_staff_restore_check"
+  }
+}
+```
+
+Этот файл удостоверяет результаты, предоставленные оператором; скрипт не проверяет доступ к хранилищу, шифрование или пригодность backup самостоятельно. Сохраните исходный backup, хеш и протокол restore drill вне сервера приложения.
+
+## Apply
+
+Проверьте dry-run и backup evidence, остановите приложение, затем запускайте в согласованное окно. `--actor` — ULID уполномоченного пользователя Core, не пароль или секрет:
+
+```powershell
+node scripts/rehome-tenant.mjs --apply `
+  --source <ULID> --target <ULID> --actor <CORE_USER_ULID> `
+  --backup-evidence .\evidence\restore-drill.json
+```
+
+Apply использует одну транзакцию, сериализуемый уровень изоляции, advisory lock и детерминированные `ACCESS EXCLUSIVE` locks всех таблиц `public.staff_*`. Скрипт отказывает, если целевой tenant уже содержит строки, таблица лишена `tenant_id` или FORCE RLS, обнаружен неизвестный пользовательский trigger либо внешний FK, или роль БД не может безопасно выполнить перенос. Существующие FK сохраняются с их определениями и состоянием validation; если проверка после пересоздания не совпала, транзакция откатывается.
+
+Отчёт содержит количества перенесённых строк и суммы `staff_payroll_ledger.amount_minor` отдельно по валюте. В `staff_audit_log` перенос сам создаёт ровно одну новую запись `tenant.rehomed` под целевым tenant. Поэтому число строк `staff_audit_log` после commit равно исходному числу строк источника плюс одна; по всем остальным таблицам количество равно исходному. Запись аудита включает from/to, исходные количества, суммы реестра, Core actor, correlation ID и SHA-256/время backup и проверки restore.
+
+При ошибке stdout/stderr не содержит URL подключения, значений строк или текста серверной ошибки: транзакция откатывается, а в stderr печатается только безопасное сообщение и, если есть, пятисимвольный PostgreSQL SQLSTATE. После успешного commit отдельно проверьте `SELECT DISTINCT tenant_id` по каждой staff таблице, количества строк, сумму реестра по валюте и наличие записи `tenant.rehomed`.
+
+## Интеграционный тест
+
+Тест `tests/integration/rehome-tenant.test.ts` предназначен только для отдельной пустой PostgreSQL 17 базы, имя которой заканчивается на `_rehome_test`. Он требует `DATABASE_REHOME_TEST_URL` и явное `DATABASE_REHOME_TEST_CONFIRM=I_ACKNOWLEDGE_DISPOSABLE_PG17_DATABASE`, создаёт в ней роль приложения без пароля при необходимости и применяет миграции на чистой схеме. В конце тест очищает таблицы `public.staff_*`; проверка пустоты выполняется до вставки фикстур. Не указывайте production, pilot или общую базу.
--- a/scripts/rehome-tenant.d.mts
+++ b/scripts/rehome-tenant.d.mts
@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+import type { Client } from 'pg';
+
+export interface BackupEvidenceReport {
+  backup: {
+    format: 'pg_dump -Fc';
+    encrypted: true;
+    offHost: true;
+    sha256: string;
+    createdAt: string;
+  };
+  restoreDrill: {
+    status: 'passed';
+    backupSha256: string;
+    restoredAt: string;
+    verifiedAt: string;
+    isolatedDatabase: string;
+  };
+}
+
+export interface RehomeOptions {
+  mode: 'dry-run' | 'apply';
+  source: string;
+  target: string;
+  actor?: string;
+  correlationId?: string;
+  backupEvidence?: BackupEvidenceReport;
+}
+
+export interface RehomeReport {
+  mode: 'dry-run' | 'apply';
+  source: string;
+  target: string;
+  tables: Record<string, string>;
+  auditRowsAdded?: 1;
+  payrollLedger?: Array<{ currency: string; amountMinor: string }>;
+}
+
+export interface ParsedTenantRehomeArgs {
+  mode: 'dry-run' | 'apply';
+  source: string;
+  target: string;
+  actor?: string;
+  backup_evidence?: string;
+  json?: true;
+}
+
+export function parseTenantRehomeArgs(args: string[]): ParsedTenantRehomeArgs;
+export function validateBackupEvidenceObject(
+  evidence: unknown,
+): BackupEvidenceReport;
+export function validateBackupEvidence(filePath: string): Promise<BackupEvidenceReport>;
+export function rehomeTenant(client: Client, options: RehomeOptions): Promise<RehomeReport>;
--- a/scripts/rehome-tenant.mjs
+++ b/scripts/rehome-tenant.mjs
@ -0,0 +1,408 @@
+import { readFile } from 'node:fs/promises';
+import path from 'node:path';
+import { pathToFileURL } from 'node:url';
+import pg from 'pg';
+import { ulid } from 'ulid';
+
+const ULID_RE = /^[0-9A-HJKMNP-TV-Z]{26}$/;
+const EXPECTED_TABLES = [
+  'staff_audit_log',
+  'staff_attendance_events',
+  'staff_daily_metrics',
+  'staff_employees',
+  'staff_idempotency_keys',
+  'staff_inbox',
+  'staff_metric_definitions',
+  'staff_notification_deliveries',
+  'staff_org_unit_terms',
+  'staff_org_units',
+  'staff_outbox',
+  'staff_pay_assignments',
+  'staff_pay_rules',
+  'staff_payroll_ledger',
+  'staff_payroll_lines',
+  'staff_payroll_runs',
+  'staff_professions',
+  'staff_push_subscriptions',
+  'staff_standalone_employee_access',
+  'staff_sync_change_log',
+  'staff_sync_command_inbox',
+  'staff_sync_device_checkpoints',
+  'staff_sync_devices',
+  'staff_timesheet_entries',
+  'staff_work_items',
+  'staff_work_sessions',
+  'staff_payouts',
+];
+
+class SafeOperationError extends Error {}
+
+const identifier = (value) => `"${String(value).replaceAll('"', '""')}"`;
+const qualified = (schema, table) => `${identifier(schema)}.${identifier(table)}`;
+
+export function parseTenantRehomeArgs(args) {
+  const result = {};
+  for (let index = 0; index < args.length; index += 1) {
+    const key = args[index];
+    if (key === '--dry-run' || key === '--apply') {
+      if (result.mode) throw new SafeOperationError('Choose exactly one of --dry-run or --apply.');
+      result.mode = key.slice(2);
+    } else if (key === '--json') {
+      if (result.json) throw new SafeOperationError('Duplicate option --json.');
+      result.json = true;
+    } else if (['--source', '--from', '--target', '--to', '--actor', '--backup-evidence'].includes(key)) {
+      const value = args[index + 1];
+      if (!value || value.startsWith('--')) throw new SafeOperationError(`Missing value for ${key}.`);
+      const name = ({
+        '--source': 'source',
+        '--from': 'source',
+        '--target': 'target',
+        '--to': 'target',
+        '--actor': 'actor',
+        '--backup-evidence': 'backup_evidence',
+      })[key];
+      if (result[name]) throw new SafeOperationError(`Duplicate option for ${name.replaceAll('_', '-')}.`);
+      result[name] = value;
+      index += 1;
+    } else {
+      throw new SafeOperationError(`Unknown option ${key}.`);
+    }
+  }
+
+  result.mode ??= 'dry-run';
+  for (const name of ['source', 'target']) {
+    if (!ULID_RE.test(result[name] ?? '')) throw new SafeOperationError(`--${name} must be a valid ULID.`);
+  }
+  if (result.source === result.target) throw new SafeOperationError('Source and target tenant IDs must differ.');
+  if (result.mode === 'apply') {
+    if (!ULID_RE.test(result.actor ?? '')) throw new SafeOperationError('--actor must be a valid Core user ULID for --apply.');
+    if (!result.backup_evidence) throw new SafeOperationError('--backup-evidence is required for --apply.');
+  } else if (result.actor || result.backup_evidence) {
+    throw new SafeOperationError('--actor and --backup-evidence are only valid with --apply.');
+  }
+  return result;
+}
+
+export function validateBackupEvidenceObject(evidence) {
+  const backup = evidence?.backup;
+  const restore = evidence?.restoreDrill;
+  const sha256 = /^[a-f0-9]{64}$/i;
+  const isoDate = (value) => typeof value === 'string' && Number.isFinite(Date.parse(value));
+  if (
+    backup?.format !== 'pg_dump -Fc' ||
+    backup?.encrypted !== true ||
+    backup?.offHost !== true ||
+    !sha256.test(backup?.sha256 ?? '') ||
+    !isoDate(backup?.createdAt) ||
+    restore?.status !== 'passed' ||
+    !isoDate(restore?.restoredAt) ||
+    !sha256.test(restore?.backupSha256 ?? '') ||
+    backup.sha256.toLowerCase() !== restore.backupSha256.toLowerCase() ||
+    typeof restore?.isolatedDatabase !== 'string' ||
+    restore.isolatedDatabase.trim() === '' ||
+    !isoDate(restore?.verifiedAt)
+  ) {
+    throw new SafeOperationError('Backup evidence does not attest an encrypted off-host custom dump and successful isolated restore.');
+  }
+  return {
+    backup: {
+      format: 'pg_dump -Fc',
+      encrypted: true,
+      offHost: true,
+      sha256: backup.sha256.toLowerCase(),
+      createdAt: backup.createdAt,
+    },
+    restoreDrill: {
+      status: 'passed',
+      backupSha256: restore.backupSha256.toLowerCase(),
+      restoredAt: restore.restoredAt,
+      verifiedAt: restore.verifiedAt,
+      isolatedDatabase: restore.isolatedDatabase,
+    },
+  };
+}
+
+export async function validateBackupEvidence(filePath) {
+  let evidence;
+  try {
+    evidence = JSON.parse(await readFile(path.resolve(filePath), 'utf8'));
+  } catch {
+    throw new SafeOperationError('Backup evidence must be a readable JSON restore report.');
+  }
+  return validateBackupEvidenceObject(evidence);
+}
+
+async function discoverTenantTables(client) {
+  const result = await client.query(`
+    SELECT c.relname AS table_name,
+           c.relrowsecurity AS rls_enabled,
+           c.relforcerowsecurity AS rls_forced,
+           pg_get_userbyid(c.relowner) AS table_owner,
+           EXISTS (
+             SELECT 1 FROM pg_attribute a
+             WHERE a.attrelid = c.oid AND a.attname = 'tenant_id'
+               AND a.attnum > 0 AND NOT a.attisdropped
+           ) AS has_tenant_id
+      FROM pg_class c
+      JOIN pg_namespace n ON n.oid = c.relnamespace
+     WHERE n.nspname = 'public'
+       AND c.relkind IN ('r', 'p')
+       AND left(c.relname, 6) = 'staff_'
+     ORDER BY c.relname
+  `);
+  const tables = result.rows;
+  if (tables.length === 0) throw new SafeOperationError('No public staff tables found.');
+  const names = new Set(tables.map((table) => table.table_name));
+  const missing = EXPECTED_TABLES.filter((table) => !names.has(table));
+  if (missing.length) throw new SafeOperationError('The database schema is missing required staff tables.');
+  if (tables.some((table) => !table.has_tenant_id)) {
+    throw new SafeOperationError('A public staff table has no tenant_id column; refusing an incomplete rehome.');
+  }
+  if (tables.some((table) => !table.rls_enabled || !table.rls_forced)) {
+    throw new SafeOperationError('Every public staff table must have ENABLE and FORCE ROW LEVEL SECURITY.');
+  }
+  return tables;
+}
+
+async function assertAdministrator(client, tables) {
+  const result = await client.query(`
+    SELECT current_user AS role_name,
+           r.rolsuper AS is_superuser,
+           r.rolbypassrls AS bypasses_rls
+      FROM pg_roles r
+     WHERE r.rolname = current_user
+  `);
+  const role = result.rows[0];
+  if (!role || role.role_name === 'krona_staff_app' || (!role.is_superuser && !role.bypasses_rls)) {
+    throw new SafeOperationError('A privileged database administrator role with RLS bypass is required.');
+  }
+  if (!role.is_superuser && tables.some((table) => table.table_owner !== role.role_name)) {
+    throw new SafeOperationError('A non-superuser administrator must own every staff table.');
+  }
+}
+
+async function assertSafeTriggersAndForeignKeys(client, tables) {
+  const names = tables.map((table) => table.table_name);
+  const triggers = await client.query(
+    `SELECT c.relname AS table_name, t.tgname AS trigger_name
+       FROM pg_trigger t
+       JOIN pg_class c ON c.oid = t.tgrelid
+       JOIN pg_namespace n ON n.oid = c.relnamespace
+      WHERE n.nspname = 'public' AND c.relname = ANY($1::text[])
+        AND NOT t.tgisinternal
+      ORDER BY c.relname, t.tgname`,
+    [names],
+  );
+  if (triggers.rowCount) {
+    throw new SafeOperationError('Unrecognized user-defined triggers exist on staff tables; refusing to continue.');
+  }
+
+  const fks = await client.query(`
+    SELECT con.conname AS constraint_name,
+           src_ns.nspname AS source_schema,
+           src.relname AS source_table,
+           dst_ns.nspname AS target_schema,
+           dst.relname AS target_table,
+           pg_get_constraintdef(con.oid, true) AS definition,
+           con.convalidated AS is_validated
+      FROM pg_constraint con
+      JOIN pg_class src ON src.oid = con.conrelid
+      JOIN pg_namespace src_ns ON src_ns.oid = src.relnamespace
+      JOIN pg_class dst ON dst.oid = con.confrelid
+      JOIN pg_namespace dst_ns ON dst_ns.oid = dst.relnamespace
+     WHERE con.contype = 'f'
+       AND (src_ns.nspname = 'public' AND src.relname = ANY($1::text[])
+         OR dst_ns.nspname = 'public' AND dst.relname = ANY($1::text[]))
+     ORDER BY src_ns.nspname, src.relname, con.conname
+  `, [names]);
+  if (fks.rows.some((fk) =>
+    fk.source_schema !== 'public' || fk.target_schema !== 'public' ||
+    !names.includes(fk.source_table) || !names.includes(fk.target_table)
+  )) {
+    throw new SafeOperationError('A foreign key crosses the staff tenant-table boundary; refusing an incomplete rehome.');
+  }
+  return fks.rows;
+}
+
+async function tableCounts(client, tables, tenantId) {
+  const counts = {};
+  for (const { table_name: table } of tables) {
+    const { rows } = await client.query(
+      `SELECT count(*)::text AS row_count FROM ${qualified('public', table)} WHERE tenant_id = $1`,
+      [tenantId],
+    );
+    counts[table] = rows[0].row_count;
+  }
+  return counts;
+}
+
+async function ledgerTotals(client, tenantId) {
+  const result = await client.query(
+    `SELECT currency_code, sum(amount_minor)::text AS amount_minor
+       FROM public.staff_payroll_ledger WHERE tenant_id = $1
+      GROUP BY currency_code ORDER BY currency_code`,
+    [tenantId],
+  );
+  return result.rows.map(({ currency_code, amount_minor }) => ({ currency: currency_code, amountMinor: amount_minor }));
+}
+
+async function lockTables(client, tables) {
+  for (const { table_name: table } of tables) {
+    await client.query(`LOCK TABLE ${qualified('public', table)} IN ACCESS EXCLUSIVE MODE`);
+  }
+}
+
+export async function rehomeTenant(client, options) {
+  const { source, target, mode } = options;
+  if (!ULID_RE.test(source ?? '') || !ULID_RE.test(target ?? '') || source === target) {
+    throw new SafeOperationError('Source and target tenant IDs must be distinct valid ULIDs.');
+  }
+  if (mode !== 'dry-run' && mode !== 'apply') throw new SafeOperationError('Mode must be dry-run or apply.');
+  if (mode === 'apply') {
+    if (!ULID_RE.test(options.actor ?? '')) throw new SafeOperationError('An authorized Core actor ULID is required.');
+    if (!options.backupEvidence) throw new SafeOperationError('Validated backup evidence is required.');
+    options.backupEvidence = validateBackupEvidenceObject(options.backupEvidence);
+  }
+
+  await client.query(mode === 'dry-run' ? 'BEGIN ISOLATION LEVEL REPEATABLE READ READ ONLY' : 'BEGIN ISOLATION LEVEL SERIALIZABLE');
+  let committed = false;
+  try {
+    if (mode === 'apply') {
+      await client.query('SELECT pg_advisory_xact_lock($1)', [7_347_821_009]);
+    }
+    const tables = await discoverTenantTables(client);
+    await assertAdministrator(client, tables);
+    if (mode === 'apply') {
+      await lockTables(client, tables);
+      const lockedTables = await discoverTenantTables(client);
+      if (lockedTables.map((table) => table.table_name).join('\n') !== tables.map((table) => table.table_name).join('\n')) {
+        throw new SafeOperationError('The set of staff tables changed while acquiring locks.');
+      }
+    }
+
+    const sourceCounts = await tableCounts(client, tables, source);
+    const targetCounts = await tableCounts(client, tables, target);
+    const sourceTotal = Object.values(sourceCounts).reduce((total, count) => total + BigInt(count), 0n);
+    const targetTotal = Object.values(targetCounts).reduce((total, count) => total + BigInt(count), 0n);
+    if (targetTotal > 0n) throw new SafeOperationError('Target tenant already contains staff data; refusing merge.');
+    if (sourceTotal === 0n) throw new SafeOperationError('Source tenant contains no staff data.');
+
+    const report = { mode, source, target, tables: sourceCounts };
+    if (mode === 'dry-run') {
+      await client.query('COMMIT');
+      committed = true;
+      return report;
+    }
+
+    const foreignKeys = await assertSafeTriggersAndForeignKeys(client, tables);
+    const ledgerBefore = await ledgerTotals(client, source);
+    for (const fk of foreignKeys) {
+      await client.query(
+        `ALTER TABLE ${qualified(fk.source_schema, fk.source_table)} DROP CONSTRAINT ${identifier(fk.constraint_name)}`,
+      );
+    }
+    for (const { table_name: table } of tables) {
+      await client.query(
+        `UPDATE ${qualified('public', table)} SET tenant_id = $1 WHERE tenant_id = $2`,
+        [target, source],
+      );
+    }
+    for (const fk of foreignKeys) {
+      let definition = fk.definition;
+      if (!fk.is_validated && !/\bNOT VALID\s*$/i.test(definition)) definition += ' NOT VALID';
+      await client.query(
+        `ALTER TABLE ${qualified(fk.source_schema, fk.source_table)} ADD CONSTRAINT ${identifier(fk.constraint_name)} ${definition}`,
+      );
+    }
+    const restoredForeignKeys = await assertSafeTriggersAndForeignKeys(client, tables);
+    const foreignKeySignature = (fk) => [
+      fk.source_schema, fk.source_table, fk.constraint_name, fk.target_schema,
+      fk.target_table, fk.definition, fk.is_validated,
+    ].join('\u0000');
+    if (
+      foreignKeys.map(foreignKeySignature).join('\n') !==
+      restoredForeignKeys.map(foreignKeySignature).join('\n')
+    ) {
+      throw new SafeOperationError('Foreign key definitions changed during tenant rehome.');
+    }
+
+    const movedCounts = await tableCounts(client, tables, target);
+    const remainingCounts = await tableCounts(client, tables, source);
+    for (const { table_name: table } of tables) {
+      if (BigInt(movedCounts[table]) !== BigInt(sourceCounts[table]) || BigInt(remainingCounts[table]) !== 0n) {
+        throw new SafeOperationError('Post-move tenant row counts do not match expected values.');
+      }
+    }
+    const ledgerAfter = await ledgerTotals(client, target);
+    if (JSON.stringify(ledgerAfter) !== JSON.stringify(ledgerBefore)) {
+      throw new SafeOperationError('Payroll ledger totals changed during tenant rehome.');
+    }
+    const actor = options.actor;
+    const correlationId = options.correlationId ?? ulid();
+    if (!ULID_RE.test(correlationId)) throw new SafeOperationError('Correlation ID must be a valid ULID.');
+    await client.query(
+      `INSERT INTO public.staff_audit_log
+         (id, tenant_id, actor_id, action, entity_type, entity_id, old_values, new_values, correlation_id)
+       VALUES ($1, $2, $3, 'tenant.rehomed', 'tenant_rehome', NULL, $4::jsonb, $5::jsonb, $6)`,
+      [ulid(), target, actor,
+        JSON.stringify({ tenantId: source, rowCounts: sourceCounts, payrollLedger: ledgerBefore }),
+        JSON.stringify({
+          tenantId: target,
+          rowCounts: movedCounts,
+          auditRowsAdded: 1,
+          backupEvidence: options.backupEvidence,
+        }), correlationId],
+    );
+    const actualAuditCount = BigInt((await tableCounts(client, [{ table_name: 'staff_audit_log' }], target)).staff_audit_log);
+    if (actualAuditCount !== BigInt(movedCounts.staff_audit_log) + 1n) {
+      throw new SafeOperationError('Tenant rehome audit row was not recorded exactly once.');
+    }
+    movedCounts.staff_audit_log = actualAuditCount.toString();
+    report.tables = movedCounts;
+    report.auditRowsAdded = 1;
+    report.payrollLedger = ledgerAfter;
+    await client.query('COMMIT');
+    committed = true;
+    return report;
+  } catch (error) {
+    if (!committed) await client.query('ROLLBACK').catch(() => undefined);
+    throw error;
+  }
+}
+
+function parseCli(args) {
+  const options = parseTenantRehomeArgs(args);
+  const connectionString = process.env.DATABASE_ADMIN_URL ?? process.env.DATABASE_REHOME_URL ?? process.env.DATABASE_MIGRATION_URL;
+  if (!connectionString) throw new SafeOperationError('Set DATABASE_ADMIN_URL, DATABASE_REHOME_URL, or DATABASE_MIGRATION_URL.');
+  return { ...options, connectionString };
+}
+
+async function main() {
+  let options;
+  let client;
+  try {
+    options = parseCli(process.argv.slice(2));
+    if (options.mode === 'apply') options.backupEvidence = await validateBackupEvidence(options.backup_evidence);
+    client = new pg.Client({ connectionString: options.connectionString, application_name: 'krona-staff-tenant-rehome' });
+    await client.connect();
+    const report = await rehomeTenant(client, {
+      source: options.source,
+      target: options.target,
+      actor: options.actor,
+      mode: options.mode,
+      backupEvidence: options.backupEvidence,
+    });
+    process.stdout.write(`${JSON.stringify(report, null, 2)}\n`);
+  } catch (error) {
+    const code = typeof error?.code === 'string' && /^[A-Z0-9]{5}$/.test(error.code) ? ` (database code ${error.code})` : '';
+    const reason = error instanceof SafeOperationError ? ` ${error.message}` : '';
+    process.stderr.write(`Tenant rehome stopped.${reason}${code} No connection details or row contents were printed.\n`);
+    process.exitCode = 1;
+  } finally {
+    await client?.end().catch(() => undefined);
+  }
+}
+
+if (process.argv[1] && import.meta.url === pathToFileURL(path.resolve(process.argv[1])).href) {
+  await main();
+}
--- a/tests/integration/rehome-tenant.test.ts
+++ b/tests/integration/rehome-tenant.test.ts
@ -0,0 +1,419 @@
+import { readFile, readdir } from 'node:fs/promises';
+import path from 'node:path';
+import { afterAll, beforeAll, describe, expect, it } from 'vitest';
+import pg from 'pg';
+import type { QueryResultRow } from 'pg';
+import { ulid } from 'ulid';
+import { rehomeTenant } from '../../scripts/rehome-tenant.mjs';
+
+const connectionString = process.env.DATABASE_REHOME_TEST_URL;
+const describeDatabase = connectionString ? describe : describe.skip;
+const confirmation = 'I_ACKNOWLEDGE_DISPOSABLE_PG17_DATABASE';
+const evidence = {
+  backup: {
+    format: 'pg_dump -Fc',
+    encrypted: true,
+    offHost: true,
+    sha256: 'a'.repeat(64),
+    createdAt: '2026-09-26T08:00:00Z',
+  },
+  restoreDrill: {
+    status: 'passed',
+    backupSha256: 'a'.repeat(64),
+    restoredAt: '2026-09-26T08:30:00Z',
+    verifiedAt: '2026-09-26T08:45:00Z',
+    isolatedDatabase: 'krona_staff_restore_check',
+  },
+} as const;
+
+const tenantTables = [
+  'staff_outbox', 'staff_inbox', 'staff_idempotency_keys', 'staff_audit_log',
+  'staff_employees', 'staff_attendance_events', 'staff_timesheet_entries',
+  'staff_org_units', 'staff_org_unit_terms', 'staff_metric_definitions',
+  'staff_daily_metrics', 'staff_work_items', 'staff_pay_rules', 'staff_pay_assignments',
+  'staff_work_sessions', 'staff_payroll_runs', 'staff_payroll_lines', 'staff_payouts',
+  'staff_payroll_ledger', 'staff_standalone_employee_access', 'staff_professions',
+  'staff_push_subscriptions', 'staff_notification_deliveries', 'staff_sync_devices',
+  'staff_sync_change_log', 'staff_sync_command_inbox', 'staff_sync_device_checkpoints',
+];
+
+interface IdentityRow extends QueryResultRow {
+  database_name: string;
+  version_num: number;
+  is_superuser: boolean;
+}
+
+interface CountRow extends QueryResultRow {
+  count: number;
+}
+
+interface RoleRow extends QueryResultRow {
+  rolsuper: boolean;
+  rolbypassrls: boolean;
+}
+
+interface PresentRow extends QueryResultRow {
+  present: boolean;
+}
+
+interface TableNameRow extends QueryResultRow {
+  relname: string;
+}
+
+interface RowCountRow extends QueryResultRow {
+  n: string;
+}
+
+interface ForeignKeyRow extends QueryResultRow {
+  source_table: string;
+  conname: string;
+  definition: string;
+  convalidated: boolean;
+}
+
+interface RehomeAuditRow extends QueryResultRow {
+  action: string;
+  actor_id: string;
+  old_values: { tenantId: string };
+  new_values: { tenantId: string; auditRowsAdded: number };
+}
+
+async function bootstrapDisposableDatabase(client: pg.Client) {
+  if (process.env.DATABASE_REHOME_TEST_CONFIRM !== confirmation) {
+    throw new Error(`Set DATABASE_REHOME_TEST_CONFIRM=${confirmation} only for a disposable test database.`);
+  }
+  const identity = await client.query<IdentityRow>(`
+    SELECT current_database() AS database_name,
+           current_setting('server_version_num')::integer AS version_num,
+           role.rolsuper AS is_superuser
+      FROM pg_roles role WHERE role.rolname = current_user
+  `);
+  const row = identity.rows[0]!;
+  if (!row.database_name.endsWith('_rehome_test') || row.version_num < 170000 || !row.is_superuser) {
+    throw new Error('Integration tests require a disposable database ending _rehome_test on PostgreSQL 17 and a superuser connection.');
+  }
+
+  const existing = await client.query<CountRow>(`
+    SELECT count(*)::integer AS count FROM pg_class c
+    JOIN pg_namespace n ON n.oid = c.relnamespace
+    WHERE n.nspname = 'public' AND c.relkind IN ('r', 'p') AND left(c.relname, 6) = 'staff_'
+  `);
+  const hasStaffSchema = Number(existing.rows[0]!.count) > 0;
+  const appRole = await client.query<RoleRow>("SELECT rolsuper, rolbypassrls FROM pg_roles WHERE rolname = 'krona_staff_app'");
+  if (appRole.rowCount === 0) {
+    await client.query('CREATE ROLE krona_staff_app NOLOGIN NOSUPERUSER NOCREATEDB NOCREATEROLE NOINHERIT NOBYPASSRLS');
+  } else if (appRole.rows[0]!.rolsuper || appRole.rows[0]!.rolbypassrls) {
+    throw new Error('The disposable database app role must be NOSUPERUSER and NOBYPASSRLS.');
+  }
+  if (!hasStaffSchema) {
+    const migrations = (await readdir(path.resolve('migrations')))
+      .filter((name) => name.endsWith('.up.sql')).sort();
+    for (const migration of migrations) {
+      await client.query(await readFile(path.resolve('migrations', migration), 'utf8'));
+    }
+  } else {
+    const checks: Array<{ table: string; present: boolean }> = [];
+    for (const table of tenantTables) {
+      const result = await client.query<PresentRow>('SELECT to_regclass($1) IS NOT NULL AS present', [`public.${table}`]);
+      checks.push({ table, present: result.rows[0]!.present });
+    }
+    const missing = checks.filter((check) => !check.present);
+    if (missing.length) throw new Error('The disposable database has an incomplete Staff schema.');
+  }
+
+  const tableNames = await client.query<TableNameRow>(`
+    SELECT c.relname FROM pg_class c JOIN pg_namespace n ON n.oid = c.relnamespace
+     WHERE n.nspname = 'public' AND c.relkind IN ('r', 'p')
+       AND left(c.relname, 6) = 'staff_'
+  `);
+  for (const { relname } of tableNames.rows) {
+    const count = await client.query<RowCountRow>(`SELECT count(*)::text AS n FROM public."${relname.replaceAll('"', '""')}"`);
+    if (BigInt(count.rows[0]!.n) !== 0n) {
+      throw new Error('Use an empty disposable database for the tenant-rehome integration test.');
+    }
+  }
+}
+
+async function listForeignKeyDefinitions(client: pg.Client) {
+  const result = await client.query<ForeignKeyRow>(`
+    SELECT source.relname AS source_table, con.conname,
+           pg_get_constraintdef(con.oid, true) AS definition,
+           con.convalidated
+      FROM pg_constraint con
+      JOIN pg_class source ON source.oid = con.conrelid
+      JOIN pg_namespace n ON n.oid = source.relnamespace
+     WHERE n.nspname = 'public' AND source.relname = ANY($1::text[])
+       AND con.contype = 'f'
+     ORDER BY source.relname, con.conname
+  `, [tenantTables]);
+  return result.rows;
+}
+
+describeDatabase('tenant rehome on a disposable PostgreSQL 17 database', () => {
+  const client = new pg.Client({ connectionString: connectionString!, application_name: 'krona-staff-rehome-integration-test' });
+  let safeToCleanup = false;
+  const source = ulid();
+  const target = ulid();
+  const other = ulid();
+  const actor = ulid();
+  const ids = Object.fromEntries([
+    'org', 'employee', 'profession', 'metric', 'rule', 'run', 'outbox', 'device',
+    'attendance', 'timesheet', 'term', 'dailyMetric', 'workItem', 'assignment',
+    'session', 'line', 'payout', 'ledger', 'access', 'subscription', 'delivery',
+    'change', 'command', 'checkpoint', 'audit', 'inbox', 'idempotency', 'otherProfession',
+  ].map((key) => [key, ulid()]));
+
+  beforeAll(async () => {
+    await client.connect();
+    await bootstrapDisposableDatabase(client);
+    safeToCleanup = true;
+  });
+
+  afterAll(async () => {
+    if (safeToCleanup) {
+      await client.query('DROP TABLE IF EXISTS public.external_rehome_reference;');
+      await client.query('DROP TRIGGER IF EXISTS rehome_test_unknown_trigger ON public.staff_employees;');
+      await client.query('DROP FUNCTION IF EXISTS public.rehome_test_trigger_fn();');
+      const tables = tenantTables.map((table) => `public."${table}"`).join(', ');
+      await client.query(`TRUNCATE TABLE ${tables} CASCADE`);
+    }
+    await client.end();
+  });
+
+  it('moves every tenant table atomically, preserves keys and totals, and audits one added row', async () => {
+    await client.query('BEGIN');
+    try {
+      await client.query(
+        `INSERT INTO staff_org_units (id, tenant_id, code, name) VALUES ($1, $2, 'unit_test', 'Fixture unit')`,
+        [ids.org, source],
+      );
+      await client.query(
+        `INSERT INTO staff_professions (id, tenant_id, code, name) VALUES ($1, $2, 'role_test', 'Fixture role')`,
+        [ids.profession, source],
+      );
+      await client.query(
+        `INSERT INTO staff_employees (id, tenant_id, profession_id, primary_org_unit_id, personnel_number, display_name)
+         VALUES ($1, $2, $3, $4, 'FIXTURE-1', 'Synthetic fixture')`,
+        [ids.employee, source, ids.profession, ids.org],
+      );
+      await client.query(
+        `INSERT INTO staff_metric_definitions (id, tenant_id, key, label) VALUES ($1, $2, 'fixture_metric', 'Fixture metric')`,
+        [ids.metric, source],
+      );
+      await client.query(
+        `INSERT INTO staff_pay_rules (id, tenant_id, code, version, name, rule, effective_from, created_by)
+         VALUES ($1, $2, 'fixture_rule', 1, 'Fixture rule', '{}'::jsonb, '2026-01-01', $3)`,
+        [ids.rule, source, actor],
+      );
+      await client.query(
+        `INSERT INTO staff_payroll_runs (id, tenant_id, org_unit_id, period_start, period_end, created_by)
+         VALUES ($1, $2, $3, '2026-01-01', '2026-01-31', $4)`,
+        [ids.run, source, ids.org, actor],
+      );
+      await client.query(
+        `INSERT INTO staff_outbox
+           (id, tenant_id, event_type, event_version, subject_type, subject_id, actor_type, actor_id, payload, correlation_id, occurred_at)
+         VALUES ($1, $2, 'fixture.event', 1, 'staff.Employee', $3, 'user', $4, '{}'::jsonb, $5, now())`,
+        [ids.outbox, source, ids.employee, actor, ulid()],
+      );
+      await client.query(
+        `INSERT INTO staff_inbox (tenant_id, event_id, event_type, event_version, correlation_id)
+         VALUES ($1, $2, 'fixture.event', 1, $3)`,
+        [source, ulid(), ulid()],
+      );
+      await client.query(
+        `INSERT INTO staff_idempotency_keys (tenant_id, key, request_hash, expires_at)
+         VALUES ($1, 'fixture-key', 'synthetic-hash', now() + interval '1 day')`, [source],
+      );
+      await client.query(
+        `INSERT INTO staff_audit_log (id, tenant_id, actor_id, action, entity_type, correlation_id)
+         VALUES ($1, $2, $3, 'fixture.created', 'fixture', $4)`,
+        [ids.audit, source, actor, ulid()],
+      );
+      await client.query(
+        `INSERT INTO staff_attendance_events
+           (id, tenant_id, employee_id, event_type, source, source_event_id, occurred_at, actor_id, correlation_id)
+         VALUES ($1, $2, $3, 'check_in', 'manual_entry', 'fixture-attendance', now(), $4, $5)`,
+        [ids.attendance, source, ids.employee, actor, ulid()],
+      );
+      await client.query(
+        `INSERT INTO staff_timesheet_entries (id, tenant_id, employee_id, work_date, updated_by)
+         VALUES ($1, $2, $3, '2026-01-01', $4)`, [ulid(), source, ids.employee, actor],
+      );
+      await client.query(
+        `INSERT INTO staff_org_unit_terms (id, tenant_id, org_unit_id, effective_from, created_by)
+         VALUES ($1, $2, $3, '2026-01-01', $4)`, [ids.term, source, ids.org, actor],
+      );
+      await client.query(
+        `INSERT INTO staff_daily_metrics (id, tenant_id, org_unit_id, business_date, metric_key, value, recorded_by)
+         VALUES ($1, $2, $3, '2026-01-01', 'fixture_metric', 123, $4)`,
+        [ids.dailyMetric, source, ids.org, actor],
+      );
+      await client.query(
+        `INSERT INTO staff_work_items (id, tenant_id, employee_id, org_unit_id, business_date, item_kind, created_by)
+         VALUES ($1, $2, $3, $4, '2026-01-01', 'fixture_item', $5)`,
+        [ids.workItem, source, ids.employee, ids.org, actor],
+      );
+      await client.query(
+        `INSERT INTO staff_pay_assignments (id, tenant_id, employee_id, pay_rule_id, effective_from, created_by)
+         VALUES ($1, $2, $3, $4, '2026-01-01', $5)`,
+        [ids.assignment, source, ids.employee, ids.rule, actor],
+      );
+      await client.query(
+        `INSERT INTO staff_work_sessions (id, tenant_id, employee_id, org_unit_id, business_date)
+         VALUES ($1, $2, $3, $4, '2026-01-01')`, [ids.session, source, ids.employee, ids.org],
+      );
+      await client.query(
+        `INSERT INTO staff_payroll_lines (id, tenant_id, run_id, employee_id, org_unit_id, business_date, pay_rule_id, rule_code, amount_minor)
+         VALUES ($1, $2, $3, $4, $5, '2026-01-01', $6, 'fixture_rule', 12345)`,
+        [ids.line, source, ids.run, ids.employee, ids.org, ids.rule],
+      );
+      await client.query(
+        `INSERT INTO staff_payouts (id, tenant_id, employee_id, paid_on, amount_minor, created_by)
+         VALUES ($1, $2, $3, '2026-01-01', 200, $4)`, [ids.payout, source, ids.employee, actor],
+      );
+      await client.query(
+        `INSERT INTO staff_payroll_ledger
+           (id, tenant_id, employee_id, business_date, kind, amount_minor, currency_code, ref_type, correlation_id, created_by)
+         VALUES ($1, $2, $3, '2026-01-01', 'accrual', 12345, 'RUB', 'payroll_run', $4, $5),
+                ($6, $2, $3, '2026-01-01', 'adjustment', 50, 'KZT', 'manual', $4, $5)`,
+        [ids.ledger, source, ids.employee, ulid(), actor, ulid()],
+      );
+      await client.query(
+        `INSERT INTO staff_standalone_employee_access
+           (id, tenant_id, employee_id, subject_id, token_hash, token_hint, created_by)
+         VALUES ($1, $2, $3, $4, $5, 'synth', $6)`,
+        [ids.access, source, ids.employee, ulid(), 'a'.repeat(64), actor],
+      );
+      await client.query(
+        `INSERT INTO staff_push_subscriptions (id, tenant_id, employee_id, endpoint, p256dh, auth)
+         VALUES ($1, $2, $3, 'https://push.invalid/fixture', 'synthetic-key', 'synthetic-auth')`,
+        [ids.subscription, source, ids.employee],
+      );
+      await client.query(
+        `INSERT INTO staff_notification_deliveries (id, tenant_id, employee_id, outbox_id, endpoint, status)
+         VALUES ($1, $2, $3, $4, 'https://push.invalid/fixture', 'delivered')`,
+        [ids.delivery, source, ids.employee, ids.outbox],
+      );
+      await client.query(
+        `INSERT INTO staff_sync_devices (id, tenant_id, device_code, name, token_hash, token_hint, created_by, org_unit_id)
+         VALUES ($1, $2, 'fixture-device', 'Synthetic device', $3, 'fixture', $4, $5)`,
+        [ids.device, source, 'b'.repeat(64), actor, ids.org],
+      );
+      await client.query(
+        `INSERT INTO staff_sync_change_log (id, tenant_id, entity_type, entity_id, operation)
+         VALUES ($1, $2, 'employee', $3, 'upsert')`, [ids.change, source, ids.employee],
+      );
+      await client.query(
+        `INSERT INTO staff_sync_command_inbox
+           (id, tenant_id, device_id, command_type, idempotency_key, correlation_id, status, created_at)
+         VALUES ($1, $2, $3, 'fixture', 'fixture-command', $4, 'applied', now())`,
+        [ids.command, source, ids.device, ulid()],
+      );
+      await client.query(
+        `INSERT INTO staff_sync_device_checkpoints (tenant_id, device_id, last_acked_cursor_seq)
+         VALUES ($1, $2, 10)`, [source, ids.device],
+      );
+      await client.query(
+        `INSERT INTO staff_professions (id, tenant_id, code, name) VALUES ($1, $2, 'other_fixture', 'Other synthetic role')`,
+        [ids.otherProfession, other],
+      );
+      await client.query('COMMIT');
+    } catch (error) {
+      await client.query('ROLLBACK');
+      throw error;
+    }
+
+    const oldRole = await client.query<RoleRow>("SELECT rolsuper, rolbypassrls FROM pg_roles WHERE rolname = 'krona_staff_app'");
+    expect(oldRole.rows[0]).toEqual({ rolsuper: false, rolbypassrls: false });
+    await client.query('SET ROLE krona_staff_app');
+    try {
+      await expect(rehomeTenant(client, { mode: 'apply', source, target, actor, backupEvidence: evidence }))
+        .rejects.toThrow('privileged database administrator');
+    } finally {
+      await client.query('RESET ROLE');
+    }
+
+    const initialForeignKeys = await listForeignKeyDefinitions(client);
+    const dryRun = await rehomeTenant(client, { mode: 'dry-run', source, target });
+    expect(Object.keys(dryRun.tables)).toHaveLength(tenantTables.length);
+    for (const table of tenantTables) {
+      expect(dryRun.tables[table]).toBe(table === 'staff_payroll_ledger' ? '2' : '1');
+    }
+
+    const occupiedTarget = ulid();
+    await client.query(
+      `INSERT INTO staff_professions (id, tenant_id, code, name) VALUES ($1, $2, 'occupied_fixture', 'Occupied synthetic target')`,
+      [ulid(), occupiedTarget],
+    );
+    await expect(rehomeTenant(client, { mode: 'apply', source, target: occupiedTarget, actor, backupEvidence: evidence }))
+      .rejects.toThrow('Target tenant already contains staff data');
+
+    await client.query(`
+      CREATE FUNCTION public.rehome_test_trigger_fn() RETURNS trigger
+      LANGUAGE plpgsql AS $$ BEGIN RETURN NEW; END $$;
+      CREATE TRIGGER rehome_test_unknown_trigger BEFORE UPDATE ON public.staff_employees
+      FOR EACH ROW EXECUTE FUNCTION public.rehome_test_trigger_fn();
+    `);
+    await expect(rehomeTenant(client, { mode: 'apply', source, target, actor, backupEvidence: evidence }))
+      .rejects.toThrow('Unrecognized user-defined triggers');
+    await client.query('DROP TRIGGER rehome_test_unknown_trigger ON public.staff_employees; DROP FUNCTION public.rehome_test_trigger_fn();');
+
+    await client.query('CREATE TABLE public.external_rehome_reference (employee_id VARCHAR(26) REFERENCES public.staff_employees(id));');
+    await expect(rehomeTenant(client, { mode: 'apply', source, target, actor, backupEvidence: evidence }))
+      .rejects.toThrow('foreign key crosses the staff tenant-table boundary');
+    await client.query('DROP TABLE public.external_rehome_reference;');
+
+    await expect(rehomeTenant(client, {
+      mode: 'apply', source, target, actor, backupEvidence: evidence, correlationId: 'invalid',
+    })).rejects.toThrow('Correlation ID must be a valid ULID.');
+    for (const table of tenantTables) {
+      const sourceRows = await client.query<RowCountRow>(`SELECT count(*)::text AS n FROM public."${table}" WHERE tenant_id = $1`, [source]);
+      expect(sourceRows.rows[0]!.n, `${table} survives rollback`).toBe(table === 'staff_payroll_ledger' ? '2' : '1');
+    }
+    expect(await listForeignKeyDefinitions(client)).toEqual(initialForeignKeys);
+
+    const result = await rehomeTenant(client, { mode: 'apply', source, target, actor, backupEvidence: evidence });
+    expect(result.auditRowsAdded).toBe(1);
+    expect(result.tables.staff_audit_log).toBe('2');
+    expect(result.payrollLedger).toEqual([
+      { currency: 'KZT', amountMinor: '50' },
+      { currency: 'RUB', amountMinor: '12345' },
+    ]);
+
+    for (const table of tenantTables) {
+      const sourceRows = await client.query<RowCountRow>(`SELECT count(*)::text AS n FROM public."${table}" WHERE tenant_id = $1`, [source]);
+      expect(sourceRows.rows[0]!.n, `${table} source rows`).toBe('0');
+      const targetRows = await client.query<RowCountRow>(`SELECT count(*)::text AS n FROM public."${table}" WHERE tenant_id = $1`, [target]);
+      expect(targetRows.rows[0]!.n, `${table} target rows`).toBe(result.tables[table]);
+    }
+    const untouchedOther = await client.query<RowCountRow>('SELECT count(*)::text AS n FROM staff_professions WHERE tenant_id = $1', [other]);
+    expect(untouchedOther.rows[0]!.n).toBe('1');
+    expect(await listForeignKeyDefinitions(client)).toEqual(initialForeignKeys);
+
+    await client.query('BEGIN');
+    try {
+      await client.query('SET LOCAL ROLE krona_staff_app');
+      await client.query("SELECT set_config('app.tenant_id', $1, true), set_config('app.user_id', $2, true)", [target, actor]);
+      const visibleToTarget = await client.query<RowCountRow>('SELECT count(*)::text AS n FROM staff_employees');
+      expect(visibleToTarget.rows[0]!.n).toBe('1');
+      await client.query("SELECT set_config('app.tenant_id', $1, true)", [source]);
+      const visibleToOldTenant = await client.query<RowCountRow>('SELECT count(*)::text AS n FROM staff_employees');
+      expect(visibleToOldTenant.rows[0]!.n).toBe('0');
+      await client.query('COMMIT');
+    } catch (error) {
+      await client.query('ROLLBACK').catch(() => undefined);
+      throw error;
+    }
+
+    const rehomeAudit = await client.query<RehomeAuditRow>(
+      `SELECT action, actor_id, old_values, new_values
+         FROM staff_audit_log WHERE tenant_id = $1 AND action = 'tenant.rehomed'`, [target],
+    );
+    expect(rehomeAudit.rows).toHaveLength(1);
+    expect(rehomeAudit.rows[0]!.actor_id).toBe(actor);
+    expect(rehomeAudit.rows[0]!.old_values.tenantId).toBe(source);
+    expect(rehomeAudit.rows[0]!.new_values.tenantId).toBe(target);
+    expect(rehomeAudit.rows[0]!.new_values.auditRowsAdded).toBe(1);
+  });
+});
--- a/tests/unit/rehome-tenant.test.ts
+++ b/tests/unit/rehome-tenant.test.ts
@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
+import { describe, expect, it } from 'vitest';
+import {
+  parseTenantRehomeArgs,
+  validateBackupEvidenceObject,
+} from '../../scripts/rehome-tenant.mjs';
+
+const source = '01J00000000000000000000001';
+const target = '01J00000000000000000000002';
+const actor = '01J00000000000000000000003';
+const sha256 = 'a'.repeat(64);
+
+describe('tenant rehome argument and evidence validation', () => {
+  it('defaults to read-only dry-run and accepts the published CLI aliases', () => {
+    expect(parseTenantRehomeArgs(['--from', source, '--to', target, '--json'])).toEqual({
+      mode: 'dry-run', source, target, json: true,
+    });
+    expect(parseTenantRehomeArgs(['--dry-run', '--source', source, '--target', target]).mode).toBe('dry-run');
+  });
+
+  it('requires backup evidence for every apply invocation', () => {
+    expect(() => parseTenantRehomeArgs(['--apply', '--from', source, '--to', target, '--actor', actor]))
+      .toThrow('--backup-evidence is required');
+    expect(() => parseTenantRehomeArgs(['--from', source, '--source', source, '--to', target]))
+      .toThrow('Duplicate option for source.');
+  });
+
+  it('accepts only evidence with encrypted off-host backup and a matching successful restore', () => {
+    const fullEvidence = {
+      backup: {
+        format: 'pg_dump -Fc' as const,
+        encrypted: true as const,
+        offHost: true as const,
+        sha256,
+        createdAt: '2026-09-26T08:00:00Z',
+      },
+      restoreDrill: {
+        status: 'passed' as const,
+        backupSha256: sha256,
+        restoredAt: '2026-09-26T08:30:00Z',
+        verifiedAt: '2026-09-26T08:45:00Z',
+        isolatedDatabase: 'krona_staff_restore_check',
+      },
+    };
+    expect(validateBackupEvidenceObject(fullEvidence)).toEqual(fullEvidence);
+    expect(() => validateBackupEvidenceObject({
+      backupSha256: sha256,
+      backupCreatedAt: '2026-09-26T08:00:00Z',
+      restoreVerifiedAt: '2026-09-26T08:45:00Z',
+    })).toThrow('does not attest an encrypted off-host custom dump');
+    expect(() => validateBackupEvidenceObject({
+      ...fullEvidence,
+      restoreDrill: { ...fullEvidence.restoreDrill, backupSha256: 'b'.repeat(64) },
+    })).toThrow('does not attest an encrypted off-host custom dump');
+  });
+});
Author	SHA1	Message	Date
Ochenstarik	d52ecf3261	fix: accept audit harness tenant rehome CLI aliases	2026-09-26 17:02:16 +07:00
Ochenstarik	c73bb3b807	feat: add guarded tenant rehome with rollback verification	2026-09-26 16:48:10 +07:00