# Krona Staff Terminal: HTTP API Requirements & Specification **Document Version:** 1.0.0 **Status:** Approved for Production **Target Component:** Krona Staff Backend & Krona Staff Terminal / Windows Service Sync Client --- ## 1. Overview & Architectural Scope The Krona Staff Terminal (`KronaStaffTerminal.exe`) and its companion Windows Service (`KronaStaffService.exe`) operate on Windows POS / kiosk devices in branch locations. The terminal functions both in fully connected environments and during extended offline network outages. ### Security Guarantees 1. **Biometric Isolation:** Biometric fingerprint templates **NEVER** leave the physical terminal. Templates are stored strictly in local DPAPI-encrypted machine storage (`%ProgramData%\Krona\StaffTerminal\terminal-state.dat`) and are matched on-device using the biometric matching engine. No raw images, templates, minutiae, or biometric features are ever transmitted to the server or written to network logs. 2. **TLS Mandate:** All communications with the Krona Staff backend **MUST** occur over TLS 1.3 or TLS 1.2 with strict certificate verification. Disabling certificate validation or bypassing SNI/SAN checks is strictly forbidden. 3. **Transport Protocol:** Synchronous HTTPS POST requests over standard REST endpoints. --- ## 2. Attendance Sync Endpoint Specification ### Endpoint ```http POST /api/v1/staff/attendance/events ``` ### Request Headers | Header Name | Type | Required | Description | Example | |---|---|---|---|---| | `Content-Type` | String | Yes | Media type of payload | `application/json` | | `Authorization` | String | Yes | Terminal Bearer API Key | `Bearer trm_sec_991823ab...` | | `Idempotency-Key` | String | Yes | Unique idempotency key per event batch or event | `6ba7b810-9dad-11d1-80b4-00c04fd430c8` | | `X-Request-Id` | String | Yes | Unique trace ID for telemetry and crash debugging | `req_01HV8G7P89J21...` | | `User-Agent` | String | Yes | Terminal client identification | `KronaStaffTerminal/0.3.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64)` | --- ## 3. Request Payloads The synchronization client supports sending both individual attendance records and batched events. ### 3.1 Single Event Record Payload ```json { "eventId": "01J8R5QWXZ7M1P0T8C3D2E4F5G", "employeeId": "9b1deb4d-3b7d-4bad-9bdd-2b0d7b3dcb6d", "eventType": "CHECK_IN", "occurredAtUtc": "2026-09-24T08:30:00.000Z", "deviceId": "TERM-SPB-OFFICE-01", "method": "BIOMETRIC_FINGERPRINT", "isAutomatic": false, "verificationScore": 87 } ``` ### 3.2 Batch Sync Payload When draining the offline sync queue after network recovery, the client posts an array of queued events: ```json { "deviceId": "TERM-SPB-OFFICE-01", "batchId": "01J8R5R2H0K5N2P9Q7R1S3T4U5", "events": [ { "eventId": "01J8R5QWXZ7M1P0T8C3D2E4F5G", "employeeId": "9b1deb4d-3b7d-4bad-9bdd-2b0d7b3dcb6d", "eventType": "CHECK_IN", "occurredAtUtc": "2026-09-24T08:30:00.000Z", "method": "BIOMETRIC_FINGERPRINT", "isAutomatic": false, "verificationScore": 87 }, { "eventId": "01J8R6A1B2C3D4E5F6G7H8J9K0", "employeeId": "9b1deb4d-3b7d-4bad-9bdd-2b0d7b3dcb6d", "eventType": "CHECK_OUT", "occurredAtUtc": "2026-09-24T17:30:00.000Z", "method": "SCHEDULED_AUTO", "isAutomatic": true, "verificationScore": null } ] } ``` ### Field Definitions - **`eventId`** (`string`, ULID or UUIDv4): Client-generated immutable identifier of the attendance event. - **`employeeId`** (`string`, UUIDv4): Server-recognized unique ID of the employee. - **`eventType`** (`string`): Enum representing the punch action: - `CHECK_IN`: Arrival / work start. - `CHECK_OUT`: Departure / work end. - `BREAK_START`: Rest break start. - `BREAK_END`: Rest break end. - **`occurredAtUtc`** (`string`, ISO 8601): Exact UTC timestamp when the biometric verification or scheduled event took place on the device clock. - **`deviceId`** (`string`): Unique terminal identifier configured during installation. - **`method`** (`string`): Verification mechanism: - `BIOMETRIC_FINGERPRINT`: Authenticated on hardware scanner with score >= threshold. - `MANUAL_PIN`: Authenticated via administrator override PIN. - `SCHEDULED_AUTO`: Automatic shift closure initiated by terminal scheduler. - **`isAutomatic`** (`boolean`): True if generated by terminal's auto-checkout routine. - **`verificationScore`** (`integer`, null allowed): Raw biometric match score (0-100), omitted or null for automatic/manual entries. --- ## 4. HTTP Response Codes & Client Handling | HTTP Status | Meaning | Terminal Client Action | |---|---|---| | `200 OK` / `201 Created` | Event successfully recorded | Dequeue event from local offline store immediately. | | `409 Conflict` | Event with `eventId` or `Idempotency-Key` was already committed by server | **Treated as idempotent success.** Dequeue event immediately from local store to prevent head-of-line blocking. | | `400 Bad Request` | Malformed payload schema | Log diagnostic event in crash log; quarantine event into dead-letter store to prevent blocking subsequent events. | | `401 Unauthorized` / `403 Forbidden` | Invalid API token or revoked terminal license | Retain events in offline queue; update system tray status to `TrayState.Error` (`401 Auth Error`); prompt administrator. | | `429 Too Many Requests` | Server rate limit reached | Back off exponentially, respecting `Retry-After` header if present. | | `500` / `502` / `503` / `504` | Temporary server-side failure / Gateway error | Retain events in queue; schedule retry with exponential backoff (initial delay 5s, max delay 300s, with randomized jitter). | | Network Timeout / Socket Error | Terminal offline or disconnected | Keep events in persistent DPAPI-protected queue; retry on timer or upon Windows network change notification (`NetworkChange.NetworkAddressChanged`). | --- ## 5. Offline Queue Mechanics 1. **Storage Location:** `%ProgramData%\Krona\StaffTerminal\terminal-state.dat`. 2. **Protection:** Windows DPAPI `DataProtectionScope.LocalMachine` with restricted ACL (SYSTEM, Administrators, Users). 3. **Queue Discipline:** Strict FIFO ordering by `occurredAtUtc`. 4. **Retry Loop:** - Background Windows Service attempts flush every 60 seconds (or immediately when new event is enqueued via Named Pipe IPC). - If server is unreachable, delay multiplies by 1.5x up to 5 minutes cap. - Batch size: up to 100 records per HTTP request to prevent TCP fragmentation issues on poor cellular/WAN connections.