8476934153
Общая для всех проектов схема: задание — в agents/<id>/inbox/, черновики — в notes/, результат — в done/, принятое главным агентом — в _accepted/. Папки заведены для claude, codex, antigravity, hermes, grok, opencode. Причина: результаты работы расползались по личным папкам агентов и по переписке, и найти, кто что сделал, было нельзя. Место результата теперь определено заранее и одинаково во всех репозиториях. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
101 lines
3.1 KiB
Markdown
101 lines
3.1 KiB
Markdown
# OAuth Attack Matrix — Phase G-4
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**Commit:** `02a04df2719094e28db97575b9fbecb940b6ead3`
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**Date:** 2026-08-18
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## Legend
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OK / WARN / GAP / FAIL
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---
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## OAuth State / PKCE
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| # | Attack | Result | Grade |
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|---|--------|--------|-------|
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| 1 | missing state | ValidationError | OK |
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| 2 | unknown state | Unauthorized | OK |
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| 3 | expired state | Unauthorized | OK |
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| 4 | reused state | Unauthorized (deleted) | OK |
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| 5 | concurrent same state | possible double consume | **WARN/GAP** |
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| 6 | foreign browser state | fail | OK |
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| 7 | error=access_denied | state consumed | OK |
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| 8 | missing code | ValidationError | OK |
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| 9 | wrong codeVerifier | VK rejects | OK |
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| 10 | cross-tx verifier | bound by state | OK |
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## Redirect / Host
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| # | Attack | Result | Grade |
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|---|--------|--------|-------|
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| 1 | https://evil.com | → `/` | OK |
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| 2 | //evil.com | → `/` | OK |
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| 3 | /\evil.com /\\evil | → `/` | OK |
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| 4 | javascript: / data: | → `/` | OK |
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| 5 | Host poisoning, VK_REDIRECT_URI unset | Location/redirect_uri risk | **WARN** |
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| 6 | VK_REDIRECT_URI set | fixed URI | OK |
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## Session / Cookie
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| # | Check | Result | Grade |
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|---|-------|--------|-------|
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| 1 | CSPRNG session id | randomBytes(32) | OK |
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| 2 | Session fixation | new id always | OK |
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| 3 | HttpOnly Secure SameSite | yes (prod Secure) | OK |
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| 4 | Token in cookie | no | OK |
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| 5 | Memory multi-instance | FATAL if MULTI_INSTANCE | OK (guard) / WARN (limit) |
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## CSRF
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| # | Attack | Result | Grade |
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|---|--------|--------|-------|
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| 1 | cross-site Sec-Fetch-Site | Forbidden | OK |
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| 2 | evil Origin | Forbidden | OK |
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| 3 | missing Origin/Referer prod | Forbidden | OK |
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| 4 | X-Forwarded-Host trust | depends on edge | **WARN** |
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## Ownership
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| # | Attack | Result | Grade |
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|---|--------|--------|-------|
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| 1 | B accesses A’s giveaway | 403 | OK |
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| 2 | anonymous mutation | 401 | OK |
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| 3 | organizerId null | Forbidden | OK |
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| 4 | delete User with giveaways | Restrict FK | OK |
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## TokenVault
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| # | Attack | Result | Grade |
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|---|--------|--------|-------|
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| 1 | no/short key in prod | FATAL | OK |
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| 2 | tampered IV/tag/ciphertext | decrypt fail | OK |
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| 3 | marker token in API/errors | not present by design | OK |
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## Endpoint contract
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| Claim | Verdict |
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|-------|---------|
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| id.vk.com/auth vs id.vk.ru/authorize | PARTIALLY VERIFIED |
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| oauth2/auth token | PARTIALLY VERIFIED |
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| PKCE S256 | VERIFIED |
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| device_id | UNVERIFIED (often required) |
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| scope commas vs spaces | WARN |
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---
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## Summary grades
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| Area | Grade |
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|------|-------|
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| OAuth State/PKCE | **PASS WITH WARNINGS** |
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| OAuth endpoint correctness | **PASS WITH WARNINGS** |
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| Session | **PASS WITH WARNINGS** |
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| CSRF | **PASS WITH WARNINGS** |
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| Ownership/AuthZ | **PASS** |
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| TokenVault | **PASS** |
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| Redirect safety | **PASS WITH WARNINGS** |
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| Privacy | **PASS WITH WARNINGS** |
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| **Overall** | **PASS WITH FIXES** |
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## Phase 2.3
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**YES** — with mandatory `VK_REDIRECT_URI` + encryption key, single-instance or shared session/OAuth store, and planned fix for concurrent state consume + live VK ID parameter check (`device_id`, authorize path).
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